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FEDERAL CONSERVATION OF THREATENED 
SPECIES: BY ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
OR BY LEGISLATIVE STANDARD? 
Janice Goldman-Carter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act of 19731 declares that threatened 
and endangered species of fish, wildlife, and plants, "are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value 
to the Nation and its people."2 One of the purposes of the Act is "to 
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and 
threatened species."3 Congress was so committed to the conserva-
tion of "endangered" wildlife species that it enacted specific 
legislative prohibitions to protect them.4 Thus, the Act gives only 
limited discretion to the Departments of the Interior and Commerce 
in regulating the management of these species. 5 
• Student, University of Minnesota Law School (J.D. anticipated May, 1984). B.A. Williams 
College; M.S., University of Michigan School of Natural Resources. The author wishes to 
thank Brian O'Neill, attorney, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for his assistance 
and encouragement. 
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982). 
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(aX3) (1982). 
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982). The Act defines an "endangered species" as "any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(4) (1982). 
A "threatened species" is defined as "any species which is likely to become an endangered 
species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 
U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1982). Examples of threatened species include the Grizzly Bear, the 
Eastern Timber Wolf, and the American Bald Eagle. 
4. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1538(aX1) (1982), which makes it unlawful for any person to engage 
in any of a list of activities which would adversely affect an endangered species. 
5. Responsibility for administering the Act is given to the Secretaries of Interior, Com-
merce, or Agriculture, depending upon whether the species is plant or animal; terrestrial and 
fresh water or marine. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1982). The bulk of management responsibility 
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In contrast to the treatment of "endangered" species, Congress 
did not promulgate specific legislative prohibitions to protect 
"threatened" species. Instead, Congress mandated that the Secre-
tary of the Interior "shall issue such regulations as he deems neces-
sary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. "6 
The Act further requires the Secretary to "cooperate to the max-
imum extent practicable with the states," and authorizes the Secre-
tary to enter into cooperative agreements with any state which 
"establishes and maintains an adequate and active program for the 
conservation of endangered species and threatened species."7 There-
fore, in contrast to the management of endangered species, where 
the Secretary's responsibilities are specifically circumscribed by 
statute, the degree of protection provided for "threatened" species 
depends upon how the Secretary of Interior and the courts construe: 
(1) the scope of the Secretary's duty to issue regulations; and (2) the 
meaning of the terms "conserve," "conserving," and 
"conservation" as used in the Act. 
The Endangered Species Act defines the term "conserve," 
"conserving," and "conservation" as, 
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to 
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point 
at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no 
longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are 
not limited to, all activities associated with scientific resources 
management . .. and, in the extraordinary case where popula-
tion pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise 
relieved, may include regulated taking. 8 
In each case, the Secretary must decide what measures should be 
taken to conserve a particular threatened species. Regulations to 
protect a threatened species may result in stopping a dam,9 closing a 
hunting or trapping season,10 or restricting the sale of offshore oil 
and gas leases.ll Thus, political, social, and economic pressures con-
stantly influence the Secretary's interpretation of his responsibilities 
to preserve endangered and threatened species. 
falls on the Secretary of Interior, and specifically, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
[hereinafter, FWS]. 
6. 16 U.S.C. S 1533(d) (1982) (emphasis added). 
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(l) (1982) (emphasis added). 
8. 16 U.S.C. S 1532(3) (1982) (emphasis added). 
9. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
10. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). 
11. Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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One issue that has been particularly subject to controversy since 
passage of the Endangered Species Act is the extent to which the 
Secretary can allow the taking12 of resident threatened species13 in 
light of his mandate to "conserve." One view, based upon the Act's 
definition of "conservation," is that the Secretary has an explicit 
congressional mandate to increase the population of a threatened 
species, and that taking is permissible only in the extreme circum-
stance where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot 
be otherwise relieved.l 4 Under this view, the Secretary's discretion 
to permit takings of threatened species is restricted by the terms of 
Congress' legislation. 
An opposing interpretation based upon the Secretary's alleged 
discretion to promulgate regulations regarding threatened species, 
takes the view that the Secretary has considerable authority to per-
mit the taking of threatened species. According to this view, Con-
gress recognized the necessity of state management and enforce-
ment resources for full implementation of the Act,15 and therefore 
specifically directed the Secretary to cooperate with the states.16 
The management of resident wildlife has traditionally been the pro-
vince of state wildlife agencies, and many states have opposed feder-
12. The term "take" is defined in the Act as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1531(14) (1982). 
13. The term "resident species" as used in the Act refers to those species naturally residing 
in one of the fifty states. A resident species is one which has not been introduced to an area 
through artificial means, and which is generally not migratory. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(cX1), (f) 
(1982). 
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982). See supra text and note at note 8. See also Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977). 
15. CONF. REP. No. 740, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 412, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 6 (1973); S. REP. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973); 119 CONGo REC. H30,163 (daily 
ed. Sept. 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Dingell); 119 CONGo REC. S25,669 (daily ed. July 24, 
1973) (statement of Senator Tunney); Endangered Species: Hearings on H.R. 37, H.R. 2169, 
and H.R. 4859 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife Conservation and the Environ-
ment of the House Committee on Merchant Marines and Fisheries, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 204-
05 (1973) (testimony of Nathaniel Reed) [hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearings]. 
16. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1982). Section 1535(a) states that the Secretary "shall 
cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the states" in carrying out the Act. Section 
1535(b) authorizes the Secretary to "enter into agreements with any state for the administra-
tion and management of any area established for the conservation of endangered species or 
threatened species." Section 1535(c) authorizes the Secretary to enter into a cooperative 
agreement with any state which establishes and maintains an "adequate and active program 
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species." That section further 
declares that when the Secretary receives a copy of a proposed state program, he must enter 
into a cooperative program with the state to assist in implementing that program, "unless he 
determines ... that the state program is not in accordance with this chapter." 
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ally-imposed limitations on the taking of resident threatened 
species.17 Thus, under this more lenient approach, the Secretary has 
discretion to acquiesce to state demands for takings of threatened 
species; he need only restrict taking when he deems it "necessary 
and advisable" for the "conservation" of a given threatened 
species.18 This conflict in interpretation of the Secretary's role in 
implementing the Endangered Species Act is critical to the conser-
vation of theatened species. 
This article will discuss the Agency's role in implementing the Act 
by focusing on one particular controversy for case study; the 
management of the eastern timber wolf (Canis lupus lycaon) in 
Northern Minnesota. The article will first trace the Department of 
the Interior's interpretation of the Secretary's duty to "conserve" 
under the Act from the time of its enactment in 1973 to the present. 
It will then explore the legislative history of the Act's definition of 
"conservation," and the intended effect of this statutory definition 
on the protection of threatened species. The article will also examine 
the scant federal case law that has construed the scope of the 
Secretary's mandate under the Act to authorize takings of threat-
ened species. After concluding that Congress did, in fact, intend to 
limit the Secretary's discretion to allow the taking of threatened 
species, the final section of the article will examine the wisdom of 
adopting a rigid legislatively-imposed rule versus a highly discre-
tionary mandate in an area of public policy fraught with political, 
social, and economic pressures. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TIMBER WOLF CONTROVERSY 
Numerous environmental groups have recently brought suit 
against James Watt and the Department of the Interior,19 challeng-
ing United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") regulations 
permitting a sport season on the eastern timber wolf in Minnesota.2o 
Current pressures on the FWS to permit taking of the timber wolf 
stem from a long history of state predation control. This section 
17. See M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 18-34 (1977). 
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982), which provides that "whenever any species is listed as a 
threatened species pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall issue such 
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such 
species." 
19. Sierra Club v. James Watt, No. 5-83-254 (D. Minn. filed August 15, 1983); Fund for 
Animals v. James Watt, No. 5-78-66 (D. Minn. Supplemental Complaint filed August 15,1983). 
20. Final Reguations, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256 (1983); Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 
30,528-31 (1982). 
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briefly describes the history of state control measures, the onset of 
federal endangered species protection, and the current federal 
timber wolf conservation program. This section will also discuss the 
present status of the wolf population and the state of Minnesota's op-
position to federal timber wolf protection. 
A. History oj State Predation Control 
From 1849 to 1965, the state of Minnesota administered a bounty 
program on wolves within the state.21 This program was frequently 
justified as an effort to control predation on livestock. 22 During its 
116-year tenure, the bounty was renewed biennially by the state 
legislature and administered by the Minnesota Department of Con-
servation (now the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
("DNR")). This program ended in 1965 when Governor Carl Rolvaag 
vetoed the bounty appropriation, despite considerable pressure and 
criticism.23 
In addition to administering the bounty program, the Minnesota 
Department of Conservation conducted wolf control until 1965. 
Department personnel used aerial hunting, snaring, and trapping to 
kill 140-150 wolves annually from 1949 to 1954. The aerial hunting 
was terminated in 1954, and from 1954 to 1956, the annual take 
dropped to an estimated seventy to ninety wolves. From 1965 to 
1969, there was no official state wolf control program, although the 
public was allowed to take wolves.24 
In 1969 the Minnesota state legislature funded a new "Directed 
Predator Control Program." 25 This program was implemented 
primarily because of predation on sheep in the northwestern coun-
ties by coyote, not because of predation by wolves. The state 
designated registered local trappers to remove coyotes, bears, bob-
cats, lynx, and wolves (until September 1974) that were reported to 
be damaging domestic animals or wildlife. Controllers were paid fif-
ty dollars for each wolf taken and thirty-five dollars for each coyote. 
No limit was set on the number of wolves that could be taken.26 
21. A bounty program encourages the extermination of predatory animals by offering a set 
monetary reward for each carcass presented to state authorities. 
22. So FRI'I'rS, WOLF DEPREDATION ON LIVESTOCK IN MINNESOTA 2 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Resource Publication 145, 1982). 
23. [do 
240 [do at 30 
250 [do 
26. [do 
68 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:63 
B. Federal Control ojthe Wolf Population Under The 
Endangered Species Act 
1. Introduction of Federal Statutory and Regulatory Control 
The Endangered Species Act27 was enacted in December of 1973. 
The Act provided complete legal protection for wolves,28 a statutory 
mandate which the State of Minnesota opposed from the outset. The 
state initially disregarded the Act and promulgated an ad-
ministrative order that allowed the taking of endangered species 
under certain circumstances.29 On September 5, 1974, the FWS in-
formed the State that it was violating the Act and the taking of 
wolves under the State's Directed Predator Control Program was 
subsequently terminated.30 Only a month later, however, Commis-
sioner Herbst of the Minnesota DNR petitioned the FWS to exclude 
the State from the endangered range of the eastern timber wolf,31 
thereby removing all restrictions imposed by the Act on the taking of 
timber wolves in Minnesota. Although eventually accepted, a deci-
sion on the petition by the FWS was postponed pending a report by 
the Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery Team.32 
In the meantime, wolf predation control became the responsibility 
of the federal government. The FWS initiated a wolf predation con-
trol program in early 1975. In 1978, the Secretary of Interior, acting 
upon the Recovery Plan recommendations33 of the Eastern Timber 
Wolf Recovery Team, changed the classification of the wolf in Min-
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982). 
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(3) (1982). This provision directed that species designated as 
threatened with extinction pursuant to the 1966 and 1969 Endangered Species Acts (P.L. No. 
89-669, §§ 1-3,80 Stat. 926; P.L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275) at the time of the 1973 enactment 
would be deemed endangered species under the 1973 Act, pending any republication to con-
form with the new Act. The Eastern Timber Wolf was listed pursuant to these earlier acts 
through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, March 3, 1973, Appendices I-III, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973), and a related Pan-American 
Treaty. 
29. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Commissioner's Order No. 1899 (May 17, 
1974). 
30. Letter from Director, FWS to Commissioner, DNR (September 5, 1974). 
31. Letter from Commissioner, DNR to Director, FWS (October 4,1974). The endangered 
range refers to the geographical area which a particular species naturally inhabits, but in 
which it is now threatened with extinction. 
32. The Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery Team is a group of experts brought together by 
FWS to develop a strategy for conservation of the timber wolf. The creation of such recovery 
teams for each threatened or endangered species is mandated by 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982). 
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982) requires the Secretary to develop and implement the "recovery 
plans" for the conservation and survival of specific listed endangered and threatened species. 
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nesota from "endangered" to "threatened."34 This new federal rule-
making allowed authorized state or federal personnel to kill wolves 
that had committed "significant depredations on lawfully present 
domestic animals."35 These changes in classification and the preda-
tion control regulation were intended to provide greater protection 
for farmers and reduce local opposition to wolves while providing 
ample protection for wolves as required by section 4( d) of the Endan-
gered Species Act. 36 The predator control provision was designed to 
limit killing to individual targeted wolves,37 and was consistent with 
general Interior Department policy. 38 
During the summer of 1978, several environmental groups claimed 
that the FWS was not following its own regulations, and brought 
suit against the Agency to challenge the use of certain trapping pro-
cedures. Environmentalists specifically objected to the FWS's policy 
of permitting the trapping of wolves as far as five miles from af-
fected farms, arguing that such wolves probably were not responsi-
ble for killing cattle on those farms.39 In Fund For Animals v. An-
drus,40 U.S. Federal District Judge Miles Lord, clarifying what had 
already been implied in the federal regulations, ordered that control 
trapping and killing of wolves could be done only after a significant 
predation had occurred, and must, as nearly as possible, be directed 
toward the capture of the wolf or wolves responsible for the killing. 41 
The Service's trapping program was subsequently adjusted to com-
ply with Judge Lord's court order.42 
2. The Current FWS Conservation Program 
A 1982 FWS publication by Dr. Steven Fritts concluded that cur-
rent wolf predation on livestock in Minnesota is only a minor prob-
lem. Approximately one-tenth of one percent of all livestock living 
within the range are affected, and only one third of one percent of 
northern Minnesota farms suffered livestock losses in 1981.43 In ad-
dition, Dr. Fritts found that wolf predation on livestock is closely 
34. Proposed Regulation, 43 Fed. Reg. 9607 (1978) (codified in 50 C.F.R. Part 17 (1982)). 
35. [d. 
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1353(d) (1982). 
37. [d. 
38. See Department of Interior Statement on Animal Damage Control Policy (Nov. 8, 1979). 
39. S. FRITTS, supra note 22, at 4. 
40. 11 E.R.C. 2189 (D. Minn. 1978). 
41. [d. 
42. S. FRI'ITS, supra note 22, at 4. 
43. [d. at 4. 
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related to poor animal husbandry practices, such as permitting 
livestock to calve in the woods or disposing of livestock carcasses in 
or near pastures.44 The 1982 study showed that the Service's finely-
tuned trapping program has successfully reduced livestock losses at 
most farms and, along with improved livestock management tech-
niques, has effectively relieved isolated instances of livestock preda-
tion by wolves. 45 
C. The Current Status oj the Wolf Population 
The Secretary of the Interior has listed the timber wolf as a threat-
ened species in Minnesota and an endangered species throughout the 
rest of its range. 46 Approximately 1,000 to 1,200 wolves remain in 
northern Minnesota.47 This population is the only significant remnant 
of the eastern timber wolf population that once ranged throughout 
most of the eastern United StateS.48 The population is now restricted 
to about one percent of its former range.49 Reduction of the eastern 
timber wolf population in the U.S. was largely the result of the 
following factors: (1) intensive human settlement of the land; (2) 
direct conflict with domestic livestock; (3) a lack of understanding 
about the animal's ecology and habits; (4) fears and superstitions 
about the animal; and (5) overzealous control programs designed to 
exterminate it.50 
In 1981, the Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery Team set forth the 
conditions it believed necessary to ensure the survival of the timber 
wolf in the continental United States. The Recovery Team recom-
mended that the following conditions be met before the Secretary 
remove the wolf from the threatened species list: 
(1) survival of the wolf in Minnesota must be assured by pro-
tecting its critical habitat and implementing the Recovery 
Plan; and 
(2) at least one viable population of wolves must be reestab-
lished outside of Minnesota and Isle Royale, Michigan in the 
contiguous 48 states. 51 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 4-5. 
46. 43 Fed. Reg. 9607 (March 9, 1978). 
47. See EASTERN TIMBER WOLF RECOVERY TEAM, EASTERN TIMBER WOLF RECOVERY PLAN 4 
(1976). 
48. [d. 
49. S. FRITTS AND L.D. MECH, DYNAMICS, MOVEMENTS, AND FEEDING ECOLOGY OF A NEWLY 
PROTECTED WOLF POPULATION IN NORTHWESTERN MINNESOTA 6 (Wildlife Monograph No. 80 
October, 1981). 
50. EASTERN TIMBER WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 47, at 2. 
51. Recovery Team Letter to Regional Director, FWS (September 15, 1981). Pursuant to 16 
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In recent years, wolves have begun to migrate east into northern 
Wisconsin, where an estimated population of twenty-five to thirty 
wolves has now been reestablished. 52 If a viable population of wolves 
can be secured there, delisting of the wolf may be possible. 
D. The Current Position of the Minnesota DNR 
The Minnesota DNR has persistently rejected the notion that the 
timber wolf is, or ever has been, threatened in Minnesota.53 DNR of-
ficials perceive their mandate from the state legislature to include 
not only predator control for livestock protection, but also the 
management of the deer herd as top priority. 54 The DNR intends to 
reduce wolf populations to benefit the deer to the maximum extent 
permissible. 55 
Most importantly, the DNR feels that it is better able to manage 
the eastern timber wolf than is the federal government, and has 
repeatedly pressured the FWS to return management responsibility 
for the wolf to the State and to permit the DNR to resume both its 
wolf harvest and its wolf predation control program. 56 The State has 
refused to accept any management responsibility for the wolf or 
assist the FWS in carrying out its mandate under the Endangered 
Species Act unless it is given the authority to permit a regulated 
sport season on the species. 57 
The FWS regulations published in August, 198358 give the DNR 
just what it wanted: management responsibility over the timber 
wolf, and the authority to permit regulated taking of the species. The 
U.S.c. § 1533(g) (1982), the Secretary must implement the recommendations of the Recovery 
Team, unless he finds that they will not promote the conservation of the species in question. 
52. Letter from Ronald E. Nicotera, Recovery Team member, Wisconsin DNR, to Defend-
ers of Wildlife (November 4, 1981) .. 
53. See supra text and notes at notes 29-3l. 
54. P. Karns, paper presented at Symposium on Mammalian Ecology and Habitat Manage-
ment in Minnesota (March 7-9, 1980). 
55. MINNESOTA DNR, MINNESOTA TIMBER WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 11 (February, 1980). 
The DNR intends to reduce wolf populations in order to increase deer numbers despite the fact 
that severe winters and maturing forest habitat are the major causes of reduced deer 
numbers. See, e.g., VERME AND OZOGA, INFLUENCE OF WINTER WEATHER ON WHITE-TAILED 
DEER IN UPPER MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPT. NATL. RESOURCES REPORT No. 237 (1971); Verme 
and IDlrey, Feeding and Nutrition of Deer, in 3 THE DIGESTIVE PHYSIOLOGY AND NUTRITION OF 
RUMINANTS 275-282 (1972). In addition to reducing wolf numbers for deer, the DNR Manage-
ment Plan states a firm policy of encouraging the harvest of wolves as a furbearer resource. 
56. DNR Wolf Management Policy (1972, 1974, and 1977) (DNR files); MINNESOTA DNR, 
MINNESOTA TIMBER WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN (Fepruary, 1980). 
57. Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 305-28, 305-31 (1981). 
58. See supra note 20. 
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legality of the Department of the Interior's recent decision to return 
wolf conservation authority to the State depends in large part on in-
terpretation of the Secretary's authority to permit the taking of 
wolves under the Endangered Species Act. The next section of this 
article examines the limits of the Secretary's authority in light of the 
legislative history and judicial construction of the Act. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S AUTHORITY TO PERMIT 
TAKING OF THREATENED SPECIES UNDER 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
A. Introduction: Two Views of the Secretary's Mandate 
to "Conserve" 
In the nine-year history of the Endangered Species Act, the 
Department of the Interior has juggled two different interpretations 
of its responsibility to conserve threatened species. One interpreta-
tion is that the Secretary must pursue all conservation measures to 
increase populations of threatened species. This interpretation of the 
Act dictates that conservation measures do not permit allowing a 
regulated taking of threatened species except "in the extraordinary 
circumstance where population pressures ... cannot be otherwise 
relieved."59 The second interpretation asserts that the Secretary has 
discretion under the Act to publish regulations which allow or en-
courage the taking of a threatened species, and would require him to 
restrict the regulated taking of threatened species only when he 
determines that such action is "necessary and advisable" for species 
conservation.60 Despite the availability of this broad discretionary in-
terpretation of its responsibility, the Department of the Interior has 
consistently chosen not to test the validity of this interpretation, 
either in the courts or in Congress. Instead, it has attempted to 
justify its taking regulations under the strict interpretation by argu-
ing that there existed "extraordinary circumstances where popula-
tion pressures cannot be otherwise relieved."61 
The interpretation of the Secretary's statutory mandate substan-
tially affects the nature of the implementation of the Act and the 
degree of protection it affords to all threatened species. Did Con-
gress intend to give the Secretary broad discretion to determine 
when the taking of a threatened species was in its own best interest? 
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982); see supra text and notes at notes 8 and 14. 
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982); see supra text and notes at notes 15-18. 
61. See infra text and notes at notes 113-30. 
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Or did the lawmakers, perceiving the enormous pressure from states 
to permit such taking, purposely restrict that discretion to cases 
where species population pressures required limited taking? Did 
Congress intend conservation of a threatened species to mean in-
creasing and restoring its populations, or merely taking actions 
which will not hurt the species or which will maintain the status quo? 
These are the questions which must ultimately be answered by the 
courts in assessing the validity of these two conflicting views of the 
mandate to conserve threatened species outlined in the Endangered 
Species Act. 
In an effort to shed some light on this conflict in statutory inter-
pretation, this section will examine the wording of the Act itself, the 
evolution of the statutory scheme as it progressed through leg-
islative committees and floor debates, and the consensus ultimately 
reached in the House-Senate Conference Committee. Finally, this 
section will discuss federal case law construing the Act, and will 
show that the Act represents a clear congressional directive to limit 
the taking of threatened species. 
B. Construing the Secretary's Mandate to Conserve 
Whether Congress intended to give the Secretary of the Interior 
broad discretion to permit the regulated taking of threatened species 
specifically depends upon the construction of sections 4( d) and 3(3) of 
the Endangered Species Act.62 Analysis of these sections and their 
corresponding legislative history63 indicates that the Secretary may 
not promulgate regulations permitting the regulated taking of a resi-
dent threatened species in the absence of "population pressures 
within a given ecosystem [which] cannot be otherwise relieved."64 
1. The Statutory Construct 
Section 4( d) of the Act requires that the Secretary' 'shall issue such 
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation of [threatened] species."65 It authorizes, but does not 
62. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(d), 1532(3) (1982), respectively. 
63. The legislative history includes House, Senate, and Conference Reports, House and 
Senate floor debates, and House and Senate subcommittee hearings. See COMMITTEE ON EN· 
VIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EN· 
DANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 AND 1980 (Comm. 
Print 1982) (Includes House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports and House and 
Senate floor debates). 
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982). 
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982) (emphasis added). This section states that, "except that with 
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require, the Secretary to extend by regulation any of the statutory 
prohibitions protecting endangered species enumerated in section 
9(aXl) to threatened species as well. 66 The section 9(a)(1) prohibitions 
most relevant to the issue here are: the taking of an endangered 
species within the United States;67 the possession, sale, delivery or 
transportation of an endangered species;68 and the violation of any 
regulation pertaining to a threatened or endangered species and pro-
mulgated under the authority of the Act.69 
Since section 4(d) requires the Secretary to issue regulations 
necessary for the "conservation" of threatened species, the defini-
tion of "conservation" in section 3(3) of the Endangered Species Act 
dictates the nature of the protective regulations that the Secretary 
can promulgate. "Conservation" is defined in section 3(3) as, 
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to 
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point 
at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no 
longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are 
not limited to, all activities associated with scientific resources 
management . . . and, in the extraordinary case where popula-
tion pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise 
relieved, may include regulated taking. 70 
Thus, although the language of section 4(d) suggests that the 
Secretary has some discretion in determining the necessity for con-
servation regulations, the definition of conservation itself imposes a 
strict standard which precludes the taking of protected species in all 
but extreme circumstances. The statute, therefore, is not the last 
word on this issue. 
2. The Conference Report 
The wording of the Conference Report accompanying the Act is 
more emphatic than the language of section 3(3) in limiting the condi-
tions for permissible taking of threatened or endangered species. Its 
intent to restrict the taking of threatened and endangered species to 
the most extreme circumstances is evident in the following passage: 
respect to the taking of resident species of fish or wildlife, such regulations shall apply in any 
State which has entered into a cooperative agreement pursuant to Section 1535(a) [§ 6 of the 
Act] of this title only to the extent that such regulations have also been adopted by such 
State." 
66. [d. 
67. Section 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1982). 
68. Section 9(a)(1)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C) (1982). 
69. Section 9(a)(1)(G), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(G) (1982). 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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In view of the varying responsibilities assigned to the ad-
ministering agencies in the bill, the term (conservation and 
management) was redefined to include generally the kinds of ac-
tivities that might be engaged in to improve the status of en-
dangered and threatened species so that they would no longer 
require special treatment. The concept of conservation covers 
the full spectrum of such activities: from total "hands-off" 
policies involving protection from harassment to a careful and 
intensive program of control. In extreme circumstances, as 
where a given species exceeds the carrying capacity of its par-
ticular ecosystem and where this pressure can be relieved in no 
other feasible way, this 'conservation' might include authority 
for carefully controlled taking of surplus members of the species. 
To state that this possibility exists, however, in no way is in-
tended to suggest that this extreme situation is likely to occur - it 
is just to say that the authority exists in the unlikely event that it 
ever becomes needed. 71 
75 
Since the Conference Committee Report reflects the final agree-
ment between the houses upon which the Act was passed, it provides 
the most accurate index of congressional intent with respect to the 
taking of threatened species. 72 In light of the possible ambiguity that 
may result from reading sections 4( d) and 3(3) together, this express 
limitation on taking can best be understood by examining the evolu-
tion through the legislative process of the protection scheme for 
threatened species. The next subsection discusses that evolution. 
3. The Evolution of a Congressional Scheme to Protect 
Threatened Species 
a. Early Congressional Views 
The types of protection to be afforded to "threatened" species was 
a major issue during the House and Senate subcommittee hearings 
on the Endangered Species Act. The underlying rationale for the 
"threatened" species classification, provided by the Interior Depart-
ment itself, was that "it is far more sound to take the steps neces-
sary to keep a species or subspecies from becoming endangered than 
to attempt to save it after it has reached the critical point." 73 In addi-
71. CONF. REP. No. 740, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973) (emphasis added). 
72. C. D. SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.08 (4th ed. 1973); C. D. 
SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.06 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1982). 
73. EXEC. COMM. No. 442, accompanying the Administration's bill, H.R. 4758, reprinted in 
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 412); 
Endangered Species: Hearings on H.R. 37, H.R. 2169, and H.R. 4859 Before the Subcommittee 
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on Mer· 
chant Marine and Fisheries, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 House 
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tion, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Nathaniel 
Reed, testified before the Senate that the Secretary's authority to 
issue threatened species regulations was intended, "to provide a 
'halfway house' for those animals which have been restored to the 
point that they are no longer 'threatened with extinction,' but have 
not yet responded to the point at which they are ready to be com-
pletely removed from the protective umbrella of the Endangered 
Species Conservation Act of 1972."74 Moving a species from the en-
dangered to the threatened category, Reed testified could be likened 
to "a hospital where the patient is transferred from the intensive 
care unit to the general ward until he is ready to be discharged."75 
The Interior Department and Congress reasoned that the estab-
lishment of two classes of species, along with two separate degrees 
of protection, would facilitate the protection of threatened species by 
increasing the Secretary's regulatory flexibility.76 While the taking 
of endangered species, with some exceptions, would be absolutely 
prohibited, the Secretary would have discretionary authority to 
regulate the taking of a threatened species in a manner "tailored to 
the needs of the animal."77 
Initially, Congress and the Department of the Interior intended to 
vest the Secretary with broad discretion to establish protective 
measures for the threatened species. 78 In a letter responding to Con-
gressional inquiries about the Administration's 1972 bill,79 the Act-
ing Assistant Secretary of the Interior stated that once a species was 
reclassified as threatened, the Secretary could permit a limited 
harvest if it was shown to be "in the best interest of the species."80 
Testifying at House Hearings in 1973, Assistant Secretary Reed ex-
plained: "[T]he type and degree of control exercised over this class of 
Hearings). See also, testimony of Asst. Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Nathaniel 
Reed, 1973 House Hearings, at 204; Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972: Hearings 
on S. 249, S. 2199 and S. 3818 before the Subcommittee on the Environment of the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Senate Hear-
ings]. 
74. 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 69-70. 
75. [d. 
76. 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 68; 1973 House Hearings, supra note '13, at 195, 
204; 119 CONGo REC. S25,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney); 119 CONGo 
REC. H30,164 (daily ed. September 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Goodling). 
77. [d. 
78. It was not until the House and Senate bills reached the Conference Committee that the 
Secretary's discretion to permit takings was narrowed. See infra text and notes at notes 93-
95. 
79. 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 68. 
80. Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Interior to Senator Spring (September 2, 
1972). 
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animal would depend on the circumstances of each species. It could 
include a complete or partial ban on taking if deemed appropriate."81 
The House Report adopted this approach, noting: 
Once an animal is on the threatened list, the Secretary has an 
almost infinite number of options available to him with regard to 
the permitted activities for those species. He may, for example, 
permit taking, but not importation of such species, or he may 
choose to forbid both taking and importation but allow the 
transportation of such species.82 
Thus, Congress initially intended to give the Secretary broad discre-
tion and flexibility in conserving threatened species. This broad 
discretion included authority to regulate their taking. 
b. Addition to the Act of the Terms "Conservation" and 
"Management" 
A definition of "conservation" and "management" was first in-
troduced into the Act in the course of the 1973 Senate hearings. The 
suggested amendment was intended to foster federal-state co-
operative agreements and to minimize federal preemption of state 
authority to regulate the taking of resident wildlife.83 This legislative 
change was endorsed by the Department of the Interior, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the International 
Association of Game and Fish Conservation Commissioners, the 
Wildlife Management Institute, the National Wildlife Federation, 
and the National Rifle Association. According to the proposed defini-
tion, "conservation" and "management" practices were measures 
taken "for the purposes of increasing and maintaining the number of 
animals within species and populations of endangered and threat-
ened species at the optimum carrying capacity of their habitat."84 In 
addition, the proposed amendment stipulated that the terms "con-
servation" and "management" included "the protection, propaga-
tion, conservation and restoration of such species, including regula-
tion and taking necessary to these ends."85 
81. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 204. Reed's testimony refers to the delegation 
of authority to the Secretary to make protective regulations for threatened species (Section 
5(c) of H.R. 4758). Similar provisions were included in S. 1983, Section 4(d) as reported to 
Senate floor and H.R. 37, Section 4(d), as reported to the House floor. 
82. H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 11. (emphasis added). 
83. Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 Before the Subcommit-
tee on the Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 82-83, 91 
(testimony of Mr. John Gottschalk, IAGFCC) (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hear-
ings]. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 91. 
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The Senate adopted the proposed definition and incorporated it in-
to the Senate Bill86 during the floor debate.87 The House bill88 did not 
include any comparable language. At the time the amendment 
was presented, the manager of the bill, Senator Tunney, stated that 
the amendment was intended to "strengthen the purposes of this 
act, which is, namely, to protect, conserve, propagate and restore en-
dangered species," and to "articulate the type of protections the 
committee intended when it reported the bill from the committee to 
the floor of the Senate."89 
The extent to which the taking of threatened species was intended 
to be included among the "type of protections" considered by the 
Senate subcommittee is reflected in the Senate Report and the com-
ments of Senator Tunney in introducing the bill. The Senate clearly 
saw the purpose of the Act as restoring populations already 
threatened or on the decline - not merely sustaining populations at 
a depleted level. 90 This legislative history is evidence of Congress' 
desire that taking of threatened species should, at a minimum, be 
aimed at improving the status of its population. The subcommittee 
also believed, however, that the conservation of threatened species 
should be promoted by leaving the states with great latitude in 
regulating the taking of resident species.91 In introducing the bill to 
the Senate floor Senator Tunney explained that "States with active 
endangered species program are given full discretion to manage 
threatened species which reside within their boundaries."92 He 
added that "the States would have full authority to use their 
management skills to insure the proper conservation of the 
species. "93 
Although the House did not attempt to define "conservation," it 
did address the issue of threatened species protection. Like the 
Senate, the House initially intended that the Act lead to restoration 
of healthy populations.94 The House Report stated that "threatened 
species" should include not only species on the decline, but also 
"those which have achieved a stabilized position, or even were on the 
86. S. 1983, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
87. 119 CONGo REG. S25,681 (daily ed. July 24, 1973). 
88. H.R. 37, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
89. 119 CONGo REG. S25,682 (daily ed. July 24, 1973). 
90. S. Rep. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 307]. 
91. [d. at 3; 119 CONGo REG. S25,668-69 (daily ed. July 24, 1973). 
92. 119 CONGo REG. S25,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973). 
93. [d. 
94. H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 20. The House Report specifically states an intent 
to "halt and, if possible, to reverse this decline." [d. at 8. 
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increase, so long as the Secretary was satisfied that a measurable 
risk to those species could be said to exist."95 
c. Narrowing the Secretary's Discretion to Permit Taking 
Under the Act 
When the House and Senate bills reached the Conference Commit-
tee, the Senate's definitions of "conservation" and "management" 
were overhauled, apparently to reflect the Committee's intent to 
prevent the taking of threatened species from being left to the unfet-
tered discretion of state or federal wildlife agencies.96 The term 
"management" was eliminated from the Senate provision. In addi-
tion, the Committee changed the definition of the purpose of conser-
vation from "increasing and maintaining the number of animals at 
the optimum carrying capacity of their habitat," to "bring[ing] any 
endangered or threatened species to the point at which the measures 
provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary." These 
changes emphasized that the goal of conservation measures was to 
protect threatened species by removing the species from all risk of ex-
tinction, and not merely by achieving some nebulous "optimum car-
rying capacity." Finally, the Committee limited the Agency's discre-
tion to permit takings to "the extraordinary case when population 
pressures cannot be otherwise relieved," rather than whenever tak-
ing was deemed "necessary to [the] ends [of conservation and 
management]." The Committee Report left little room for doubt as 
to the Committee's intent: 
In extreme circumstances, as where a given species exceeds the 
carrying capacity of its particular ecosystem and where this 
pressure can be relieved in no other feasible way, ... "conserva-
tion" might include authority for carefully controlled taking of 
surplus members of the species. To state that this possibility ex-
ists, however, in no way is intended to suggest that this extreme 
situation is likely to occur - it is just to say that the authority ex-
ists in the unlikely event that it ever becomes needed.97 
Hence, while Congress granted broad discretion to the Secretary 
generally, it apparently reached an ultimate decision to restrict his 
discretion with respect to the taking of threatened species. The Con-
ference Committee Report contains the clear directive that threat-
95. H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 10. 
96. CONF. REP. No. 740, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973). 
97. [d. 
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ened species are to be taken only in the.most extreme of circum-
stances.98 
C. The Federal Courts' Interpretation of the Secreta77J's 
Authority to Permit Taking of Threatened Species 
No court has expressly addressed the extent of the Secretary's 
authority to permit the taking of resident threatened species. 
Limited judicial guidance, however, does exist. In Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill,99 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether to enjoin the T .V.A. from constructing the Tellico 
Dam in order to preserve the habitat of the endangered snail darter. 
Referring to the Endangered Species Act as an "institutionalization 
of caution,"loo the Court held that Congress intended to give the 
highest of priorities to protection of endangered species and stated 
that all effort and resources necessary to halt and reverse the trend 
toward species extinction should be employed. lol 
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus,l°2 the federal district court 
considered whether Department of the Interior regulations govern-
ing the permissible hours for migratory bird hunting violated the En-
dangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Acpo3 or the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. lo4 The district court held that regula-
tions permitting twilight hunting were arbitrary because the rule-
making process did not adequately focus on the FWS's obligation to 
conserve and increase the population of protected species. lo5 In con-
struing sections 4(d) and 3(3) of the Act and the Secretary's mandate 
to conserve threatened species, Judge Gesell stated: 
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, as part of the Interior, must do far more than merely 
avoid the elimination of a protected species. It must bring these 
species back from the brink so they may be removed from the 
protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so. 
The Service cannot limit its focus to what it considers the most 
important management tool available to it to accomplish this 
end. . .. [T]he agency has an affirmative duty to increase the 
population of protected species. 106 
98. [d. 
99. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
100. [d. at 187. 
101. [d. at 177, 179-80. 
102. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). 
104. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). 
105. 428 F. Supp. at 170. 
106. [d. 
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This interpretation of the Agency's mandate was qualified, 
however, by the district court's opinion in Connor v. Andrus. 107 In 
that case, the court addressed the issue of whether FWS regulations 
prohibiting all duck hunting in designated areas in order to protect 
the endangered Mexican Duck were arbitrary and capricious. The 
court held that since the federal rulemaking was not supported by 
findings that the hunting ban would increase or even tend to increase 
the Mexican Duck population, the FWS rules were not adequately 
focused on affirmative means of restoring the protected species and 
were therefore arbitrary and capricious.108 The court determined 
that the Secretary's affirmative duty to increase protected species 
populations "is not met by promulgating regulations which do not at-
tack the cause or causes of population depletion of a species."109 
Thus, according to the court in Connor, the Act may not require the 
Interior Secretary to prohibit the taking of a threatened species if 
such a taking is not related to the causes of its population depletion. 
In short, the little case law on the issue generally supports the view 
that the Secretary must employ all measures and resources available 
to bring threatened species populations to the point at which they 
are beyond risk and can be removed from the list of "threatened" 
species. This obligation would, of course, limit the Secretary's 
authority to permit taking of a threatened species. 
D. Summary: A Clear Congressional Directive to Limit the 
Taking of Threatened Species 
The question of how much discretion should be granted the Secre-
tary of the Interior to permit the taking of threatened species was 
ardently and thoroughly debated in Congress. l1O Congress never 
seriously questioned the fact that the Secretary should be granted 
broad discretion in implementing conservation strategies for threat-
ened species. In addition, it was clear to the lawmakers that the 
states wanted to retain their traditional control over the taking of 
resident wildlife species, and that they could best encourage the 
states to assume a cooperative role in conserving endangered and 
threatened species by assuring the states of such discretion.111 It 
was made equally clear in congressional debate, however, that the 
107. 453 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Tex. 1978). 
108. Id. at 1041-42. 
109. Id. at 1041. 
110. See supra text and notes at notes 70-109; infra text and notes at notes 111-132. 
111. See supra text and notes at notes 83-93. 
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federal regulations would act as a minimum standard for taking, and 
therefore, no state could permit taking of a species under a 
cooperative agreement unless the Secretary permitted such a taking 
in the applicable federal regulations.112 
The Conference Report and the bill enacted represent the Con-
gress's final position on the issue. Both the statute and the Con-
ference Report limit the Secretary's discretion to permit the taking 
of threatened species. Although the Secretary has broad discretion 
in dictating protective measures for a threatened species, his discre-
tion is bridled by his mandate to promote its "conservation." It is 
clear from the legislative history that Congress intended this man-
date to impose upon the Secretary the duty to restore the species to a 
condition where it is beyond any risk of extinction, and permit the 
taking of the species only under the most extreme circumstances; 
At times, the Interior Department has recognized this legislative 
limitation on its discretion to permit taking. At other times, how-
ever, it has interpreted its authority much more broadly. The next 
section traces the Department's interpretation of its authority to 
permit the taking of threatened species other than the eastern 
timber wolf. 
IV. THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS 
AUTHORITY TO PERMIT TAKING 
From the outset of its administration of the Endangered Species 
Act, the Department of the Interior has been pressured to permit the 
taking of threatened species. When the Department has permitted 
such takings, it has often considered adopting a broad interpretation 
of its discretion in promoting conservation in order to accommodate 
its decisions. This section discusses the Department's responses to 
pressures for threatened species taking. 
A. Early Pressures for Increased Discretion 
The Act's definition of "conservation"113 came into question in 
January, 1975, when the Department of the Interior proposed to list the 
grizzly bear (Ursa actor horrilJilis) as a threatened species,114 and to 
112. H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 13; See also CONF. REP. No. 740, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., 26 (1973); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 204·05 (testimony of Nathaniel Reed). 
113. See supra text and note at note 8. 
114. Proposed Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 5·7 (1975). The grizzly bear had not previously 
been listed. Fund for Animals, Inc. had petitioned the Department to list the grizzly bear as 
"endangered" in 1974 pursuant to the Act. These regulations were proposed in response to 
that petition. 40 Fed. Reg. 5 (1975). 
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permit a sport season on that species.115 Environmental groups 
threatened litigation if the proposal was finalized. 116 The issue of 
taking threatened species was also raised by adopted regulations 
permitting the importation, under some circumstances, of three 
threatened species of kangaroo.117 
In April of 1975, the Department of the Interior Solicitor's Office 
advised the Assistant Interior Secretary of his options with regard 
to "the annoying final phrase concerning 'taking' in the Act's defini-
tion of 'conservation,' "118 and offered some possible arguments to 
support controversial rulemaking permitting taking. One argument 
suggested that the Secretary's discretion to issue regulations that 
"he deems necessary and advisable . . . to provide for the conserva-
tion of [protected] species"119 was not restricted by the language of 
section 3(3), which limits the taking of protected species to "the ex-
traordinary case ... where population pressures ... cannot be 
otherwise relieved."120 The Solicitor's Office reasoned that the 
Secretary of the Interior need not promulgate a regulation restrict-
ing taking if he deemed that such a regulation was neither necessary 
nor desirable for the conservation of a species.121 
A second option, already under consideration by the Department 
to broaden its discretion to permit taking, was to amend the Act 
itself. Specifically, the Department considered seeking an amend-
ment of the restrictive "extraordinary case" language, emphasizing 
to Congress that the amendment would not be a new grant of power 
but only a clarification of the Secretary's existing discretion consist-
ent with the legal interpretation discussed above.122 The Solicitor's 
Office cautioned that if the amendment failed. 
Congress could be seen as having considered a ratification of our 
allowing taking of threatened species, and having rejected such 
a ratification, thereby weakening our arguments on section 4(d) 
in the eyes of any court that is called upon to consider the ques-
tion. 123 
115. 40 Fed. Reg. 5 (1975). 
116. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, Department of In-
terior to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks (April 11, 1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Memorandum]. 
117. Id.; Final Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 44,991 (1974), codified at C.F.R. § 17,40(a)(i)(B) 
(1980). 
118. Memorandum, supra note 116. 
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982). 
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982). 
121. Memorandum, supra note 116. See also Draft letter from the Secretary of the Interior 
to the Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality (attached to Memorandum, supra note 
116). 
122. Memorandum, supra note 116. 
123. Id. 
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The opinion concluded that the choice between litigating the grizzly 
bear and kangaroo cases under the new legal interpretation of sec-
tion 4(d) and pursuing an amendment to the Act immediately, should 
be decided upon the likelihood of an amendment's passage in Con-
gress. 124 
Neither of these strategies were adopted. Instead, the interpreta-
tion of the Act was side-stepped, a decision which likely reflected the 
Department's lack of confidence in its new legal interpretation. The 
legislative history of the 1976 Endangered Species Act Amendments 
reflects no effort by the Department to amend the taking restric-
tions in section 4(d).125 Similarly, when the Interior Department pro-
mulgated regulations in July, 1975 permitting the taking of grizzly 
bears, it did not attempt to base its decision upon its broad discretion 
to permit taking of threatened species. Rather, the Department 
carefully justified its decision to permit taking by asserting that 
pressures on the grizzly bear population could not "be otherwise 
relieved," and thus fell within the precise wording of section 3(3) of 
the Act permitting taking in extraordinary cases. 126 Thus, the 
Department was able to sustain its regulations permitting the taking 
of grizzly bears without arguing for a new interpretation or amend-
ment of the statute. 
During this same period, the FWS reclassified the Lahontan cut-
throat trout (Salmo clarki henshawi) from endangered to threatened 
and allowed a sport fishing season on the species.127 The primary en-
vironmental factors affecting the cutthroat trout were loss of habitat 
and competition from introduced non-native trout.128 Since state and 
federal managers were successfully re-establishing the species 
through transplantation, propagation, and removal of introduced 
species, the FWS reasoned that "sport fishing [was] an acceptable 
method of preventing overpopulation which could injure a species by 
taxing the species' habitat," and was therefore a permissible conser-
vation measure under the Act.129 
Hence, the FWS permitted the taking of the cutthroat on the same 
basis that it permitted the taking of the grizzly bear. Its regulations 
124. [d. 
125. H.R. REP. No. 887, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1976) (departmental reports); H.R. REP. 
No. 823, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-12 (1976) (text and departmental reports); S. REP. No. 63, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1975) (text and agency comments). 
126. Final Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,734-35 (1975). 
127. Final Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,863-64 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(a) 
(1982». 
128. [d. at 29,864. 
129. [d. at 29,863-64. See also Proposed Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 17,347 (1975). 
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make an implicit finding that trout populations constituted an ex-
traordinary case where population pressures could not be otherwise 
relieved. The Service received no opposition to the sport harvest of 
the trout as a conservation measure, and its discretion to permit a 
taking of threatened species in that case was not contested.130 
B. Reemergence of the Department's "Broad Discretion" 
Interpretation 
In 1980, the "broad discretion" interpretation of the Secretary's 
mandate to protect threatened species resurfaced on another front. 
At that time, the FWS promulgated regulations permitting the im-
portation of three threatened species of kangaroos from 
Australia.131 Environmental groups argued that lifting the import 
ban was the equivalent of permitting the taking of a threatened 
species in violation of the Act.132 The FWS, as it had in 1975, 
responded by letter in the following manner: 
[T]he Act does not automatically prescribe any taking prohibi-
tions for threatened species but leaves that action up to the 
Secretary's discretion .... The existence of population pressure 
is not a prerequisite to allowing the taking of threatened species 
under specific factual situations. The test under section 4(d) of 
the Act is the necessity and advisability of such regulations con-
sidering the overall status and foreseeable future of the 
species. ISS 
When the "Kangaroo Case"134 was litigated in May, 1981, the 
federal government, in its Memorandum of Law, modified its broad 
interpretation somewhat. It argued that the validity of regulations 
issued under section 4( d) must be judged on the basis of whether they 
seek to remedy the problems which led to the species' threatened 
statuS.135 In the case of the kangaroo, the government argued, the 
problem to be remedied was the inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms, not reduced population levels. The Secretary used his 
leverage first to impose, and then to lift, the import ban on the 
kangaroos as a means of encouraging the Australian States to imple-
130. [d. at 29,864. 
131. Final Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 23,929 (1981). 
132. Letter from the Associate Director of FWS for Federal Assistance to Jeffrey H. 
Howard, Attorney, Davis, Graham and Stubbs, Washington, D.C. (September 30, 1980). 
133. [d. The letter reveals coordination with the Solicitor's Office in its drafting. 
134. Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. James G. Watt, No. 81-1048 (D.D.C. 1981). 
135. Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 16, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. James G. Watt, 
No. 81-1048 (D.D.C. 1981). 
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ment effective regulatory mechanisms to protect these species. 136 
The government concluded that since the Australian States did 
enact these conservation regulations, the Secretary acted within his 
statutory mandate to "conserve" by lifting the import ban in accord-
ance with his negotiations with Australian authorities. 137 
The district court adopted this line of reasoning and upheld the 
Agency's regulations. The court's opinion, however, drew a clear 
distinction between the Secretary's conservation mandate in a 
domestic context and an international context. 138 Judge Aubrey 
Robinson explained: 
Defendants have no control over the species or its natural 
habitat. Their ability to protect the kangaroo is limited to en-
couraging the Australian States to implement programs de-
signed to ensure the species' well-being .... Because lifting the 
ban was essential in order to encourage the Australian States to 
implement measures deemed necessary by Defendants ... the 
lifting of the ban fulfilled the conservation objective of the 
ESA.l39 
Consequently, the Secretary's authority to permit the taking of resi-
dent threatened species was never addressed. 140 
The Department's responses to pressures for taking in the grizzly 
bear, Lahontan cutthroat trout, and kangaroo controversies provide 
a backdrop for evaluating its actions in the timber wolf controversy. 
That issue is discussed in the section below. 
V. CONSERVATION OF THE EASTERN TIMBER WOLF: A CASE STUDY 
OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS MANDATE 
The Department of the Interior's treatment of the timber wolf con-
troversy reveals its vulnerability to pressure regarding threatened 
species protection. Persistent pressure from the State of Minnesota 
to permit taking of the timber wolf resulted in the reclassification of 
the wolf from "endangered" to "threatened" status, and the FWS's 
reluctant acceptance of Minnesota's plan, pursuant to a cooperative 
agreement, to permit taking of the wolf. The Interior Department 
has justified these changes in timber wolf protection policy under a 
broad construction of its discretion to permit taking of threatened 
species under the Endangered Species Act. 
136. Id. at 15. 
137. Id. at 17. 
138. Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. James G. Watt, No. 81-1048, at 7 (D.D.C. 1981). 
139. Id. at 8. 
140. Id. 
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A. Reclassification of the Wolf From "Endangered" 
to "Threatened" 
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From October, 1974, when the state of Minnesota petitioned the De-
partment of the Interior for exclusion from the "endangered" range 
of timber wolf, until June, 1977, when the Recovery Team issued its 
recommendations, efforts to remove legal protections on the timber 
wolf were halted.141 During this period, state politicians and the Min-
nesota Department of Natural Resources sought Interior's legal in-
terpretation as to the extent and nature of federal power to control 
the taking of a species listed as "threatened" in a state where a 
Cooperative Agreement was signed pursuant to section 6(c) of the 
Act.142 Specifically, state authorities posed the following question to 
the Department of the Interior: "if the timber wolf were reclassified 
from 'endangered' to 'threatened,' and if the state entered into a 
cooperative agreement to manage the species, would the state have 
the authority to permit a sport season on the animal?" The response 
of the Department was "no." The Department stated that "[t]he 
Secretary could not sign a Cooperative Agreement with a state if 
the State would permit takings of a threatened species that the 
Secretary has otherwise prohibited by regulation."143 
On June 9, 1977, the FWS received the Recovery Team's recom-
mendations and published their proposed regulations regarding the 
timber WOlf.144 The regulations proposed to reclassify the wolf from 
an "endangered" to a "threatened" species.145 Although the 
Recovery Plan recommended some regulated taking of the wolf in its 
peripheral range as one part of an overall wolf recovery plan, the 
FWS rejected this recommendation. 146 The FWS determined instead 
that, 
[f]or the time being, the Service sees no justification for allowing 
the taking of non-depredating wolves. The Service could, 
141. See supra text and notes at notes 30-38. The timber wolf was automatically classified 
as "endangered" upon enactment of the 1973 Act because it had been previously categorized 
as such under the 1969 Act. See supra note 28. 
142. Letter from Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to State Representative 
Irwin N. Anderson (April 8, 1977); Meeting Minutes, Office of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service briefing of Minnesota DNR and Regional FWS personnel (June 3, 1974). 
143. Letter from Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to State Representative 
Irwin N. Anderson, supra note 63. See also Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Fish and 
Wildlife, Department of Interior, to Associate Director, Federal Assistance, Fish and Wildlife 
Service (April 28, 1977). 
144. Proposed Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,527 (1977). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 19,528. 
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however, continue to monitor the situation as recommended by 
the team, and would propose new regulations whenever war-
ranted. 147 
The Service's final rulemaking in 1978 reclassified the timber wolf 
and retained this prohibition on taking of non-depredating wolves. It 
also set forth procedures for wolf predation control. 148 
B. Initial Rejection of a Plan for Taking Timber Wolves 
In December, 1979, the Minnesota DNR and the FWS, pursuant to 
section 6(c) of the Act,149 signed a Cooperative Agreement for the 
management of threatened and endangered species within the State. 
In February, 1980, the DNR submitted to FWS a Timber Wolf 
Management Plan150 which, if approved by the FWS and Department 
of the Interior, would have provided the basis for delegation of the 
timber wolf conservation program to the state. The plan contained 
two controversial provisions, both of which permitted the taking of 
timber wolves beyond the exceptions condoned by the Department of 
the Interior as consistent with the Act's definition of "conservation" 
and the Secretary's mandate to conserve threatened species. 151 
First, the State proposal expanded the predation control program in 
a manner which permitted the taking of non-depredating wolves. 152 
Second, the proposal recommended a sport season on the wolf.153 
The Office of the Field Solicitor154 advised the FWS Regional Di-
rector in March, 1980, that the state's management plan was unac-
ceptable and inconsistent with the Agency's existing regulations,155 
The Field Solicitor informed the FWS that in order to amend the 
regulations to accommodate the taking proposed by the state, "it 
would be necessary for the Service to establish that such control 
would occur only 'in the extraordinary case where population pres-
sures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved.' "156 
Hence, the Field Solicitor recognized that the definition of "conser-
vation" in Section 3(3) prohibited any federal regulation that per-
mitted taking except in the most extreme circumstances. 
147. [d. 
148. Final Regulations 43 Fed. Reg. 9607 (1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 'i 17.40(d) (1982). 
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1982). 




154. The field office of the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. 
155. Letter from Field Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to the Regional Director, FWS 
(March 7, 1980). 
156. [d. 
1983] THREATENED SPECIES 89 
The Director of the FWS confirmed the Field Solicitor's strict in-
terpretation of the Act in a memorandum to the Service's Regional 
Director regarding the Minnesota Timber Wolf Plan.167 The Director 
of the Service concluded that the Department had no basis for chang-
ing the regulations to accommodate the state's predation control 
and sport season provisions. He suggested that the Regional Office 
meet with the Minnesota DNR to propose modification of the preda-
tion control program and elimination of the sport season in order to 
"proceed with a legally acceptable depredation control and manage-
ment program."158 Subsequent meetings between the two agencies 
in August, 1980 resulted in an impasse: the DNR would not cooper-
ate in a wolf conservation program without permission to place a 
sport season on the animal. 159 
C. Final Acceptance of a Plan for Taking Timber Wolves 
Several months after the FWS rejected Minnesota's proposed plan 
to allow taking of the timber wolf, the Minnesota DNR resubmitted 
its same timber wolf management plan to the Department of the In-
terior.160 Three months later, in July, 1981, the FWS again refused 
to accept the plan, explaining: 
The implementation of any harvest season is not legally feasible. 
The Endangered Species Act allows regulated taking of a 
threatened species only in "the extraordinary case where 
population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be other-
wise relieved." According to available biological data, the wolf 
in Minnesota is not now in such a situation.16! 
Roughly four months after rejecting Minnesota's proposal for the 
second time, the FWS expressed a willingness to reconsider the 
DNR's proposed 1980 Wolf Management Plan.162 The same plan that 
had been submitted by the state in February, 1981, and rejected by 
FWS on both occasions, was resubmitted by the DNR on October 27, 
1981.163 Pressure from Minnesota's congressional delegation had 
become particularly intense by March, 1981.164 Not inconsequential-
157. Memorandum from Director, FWS to the Regional Director, FWS (June 27, 1980). 
158. Id. 
159. Letter from Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Commissioner, Min-
nesota DNR (August 15, 1980). 
160. Letter from Commissioner, DNR to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and 
Parks (March 26, 1981). 
161. Letter from Associate Director, FWS to Commissioner, DNR (July 1, 1981). 
162. Letter from Commissioner, DNR to Associate Director, FWS (October 27, 1981). 
163. Id. 
164. See, e.g., letter of Rep. Arlan Stangeland to Secretary of Interior Watt (March 2, 1981); 
letters of State Senator Lessard to Assistant Secretary Arnett and Secretary Watt (March 24, 
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ly, several Reagan Administration appointees in the Department of 
the Interior were firmly established in their positions by this time. 
On November 3, 1981, the Associate Director of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service wrote a memorandum to the Regional Director in 
the Twin Cities and the Washington, D.C. Offices of Endangered 
Species and Research requesting comments on the resubmitted 
plan.165 The memorandum made reference to the tough legal stand-
ard permitting regulated taking only "in the extraordinary case," 
but noted a recent change with regard to the applicability of that 
legal standard. The memo stated: "I discussed this matter with the 
Solicitor's Office and found that they recently have taken the posi-
tion in the kangaroo litigation that this standard ... is inapplicable 
to threatened species."166 With the endorsement from this memo 
and the Solicitor's Office, the Regional Director then modified his 
position on the state plan. Relying also upon data supplied by the 
state purporting to indicate wolf population increases amounting to 
"population pressures ... [which could not] be otherwise relieved," 
the Regional Director indicated his acceptance of the concept of a 
sport harvest: 
Concerns associated with Service acceptance of a regulated tak-
ing have presented what seemed to be an insurmountable prob-
lem. Data supplied by the State [on October 27] and the position 
recently taken by the Solicitor as outlined in your memorandum 
of November 3, 1981 solve these problems and it appears the 
concerns raised on this issue are now moot.167 
Both of the Agency's reasons for changing its position are 
troublesome. First, the Service's own expert wolf researcher and 
member of the Recovery Team discounted the state's proferred 
population data as reflecting no significant change in the wolf 
1981, and April 6, 1981, respectively); letter from Rep. Anderson to Rep. Martin Sabo 
(September 28, 1981); letter of Rep. Martin Sabo to Director, FWS (October 14, 1981); letters 
of Sen. Rudy Boschwitz to FWS and Assistant Secretary of Interior (November 4, 1981 and 
December 14, 1981, respectively); letters of Sen. James Oberstar to Director, FWS and Com-
missioner, DNR (January 19, 1982). 
165. Memorandum from Associate Director, FWS to Regional Director, OEA, and Re-
search (November 3, 1981). 
166. Id. 
167. Memorandum from Regional Director, FWS to Associate Director, FWS (November 
16, 1981). The purported basis for this change in position-new data submitted by the State 
and a new legal interpretation of the Act-was confirmed by agency responses to Congres-
sional inquires by Minnesota Rep. James Oberstar and Sen. Rudy Boschwitz. The letters noted 
that these two new developments "might permit us to accept the plan and return management 
of the wolf to Minnesota." See Letters from Director, FWS to Sen. Oberstar (February 5, 
1982); Letter from Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks to Sen. Boschwitz 
(January 8, 1982). 
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population since 1975.168 Second, as noted previously, the Depart-
ment of the Interior did not go so far as to assert in the kangaroo 
litigation that the restrictive language on taking was "inapplicable to 
threatened species,"169 nor did the district court reach this question 
in that case.170 
Nevertheless, the Regional Office of the FWS proceeded im-
mediately to draft new regulations which would permit a sport 
season on the timber wolf, and which would otherwise facilitate 
federal acceptance of the State Management Plan. By December 22, 
1981, the Regional Office had prepared a preliminary draft of its new 
regulations for presentation at a public hearing.171 At that hearing, 
the Field Solicitor's Office articulated the "broad discretion" inter-
pretation172 of the Endangered Species Act as the legal basis for per-
mitting a sport season on the threatened eastern timber wolf: 
[B]ased on the data accumulated . . . the harvest contemplated 
is such as to have no effect on viable conservation for the wolf 
and therefore there is no particular reason not to have it .... 
The question thus turns on, what is necessary to conserve the 
gray wolf? And if a particular regulation or a particular level of 
regulation is not necessary then it would be the contention of the 
Interior Department that it is not required by section 4 .... 
[P]resumably that is the, if you will, legal basis for the regula-
tion were this preliminary draft to be proposed.173 
It is precisely this legal interpretation of the Act that was offered as 
the legal basis for the FWS final regulations permitting taking of the 
timber wolf which were ultimately published in the Federal Register 
on August 10, 1983.174 
168. Memorandum from Dr. L. David Mech to Dr. H. Randolph Perry, Jr., Leader, Ecology 
Section, Endangered Species Research, Patuxent Wildlife Research Center (December 14, 
1981). 
169. See supra text and notes at notes 133-40. 
170. Id. 
171. FWS Scoping Meeting, Court Reporter Transcript (December 22, 1981). 
172. See supra text and notes at notes 119-21. 
173. FWS Scoping Meeting, supra note 171, at 43-44. 
174. Final Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256-66 (1983). Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 
30,528-31 (1982). The new regulations considerably liberalize the federal wolf depredation 
control program and permit the State of Minnesota to administer the program. 48 
Fed. Reg. 36,265 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(dX2XiXBX4». They permit trapping of 
wolves throughout most of the state, as outlined in the Minnesota management plan. 48 Fed. 
Reg. 36,265 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(dX2XiXcX3». The regulations also authorize 
federal and state employees or agents to trap the remaining quota of wolves permitted to be 
trapped as part of the State season that are not otherwise trapped. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,265 (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(dX2)(i)(d». The overall objective of these taking provisions is to 
reduce conflicts between man and wolf. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,531 (1982), 48 Fed. Reg. 36,259-
60 (1983). 
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The new regulations can not be supported on the basis of increased 
wolf population pressures. Wildlife experts, including those of the 
FWS, observed that the biological and ecological condition of the 
wolf population in Northern Minnesota had not changed since 1975 
and did not, in and of itself, support a change in federal 
regulation.175 The population continues to be stable and within its 
biological carrying capacity, and therefore does not present an "ex-
traordinary case where population pressures within a given 
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved."176 The primary rationale 
thus proffered by the FWS for its new position was more nebulous: 
according to the FWS, the trapping of wolves is necessary to make 
wolves more "wary" of humans in areas of human habitation and to 
reduce public antagonism toward the species.177 The Service rea-
soned that by reducing public antagonism toward the wolf, illegal 
killing of the species will be reduced and the species will be better 
protected.178 This sociological rationale for taking is a significant 
departure from the rationale which supported the taking regulations 
for the grizzly bearl79 and the Lahotan cutthroat trout.180 In both 
those instances, the Department of the Interior justified the public 
taking on the basis of existing or anticipated population pressures, in 
accordance with the strict interpretation of the "conservation" 
definition in Section 3(3) of the Act. 
Clearly, a dramatic change occurred in federal policy toward wolf 
conservation in Minnesota between July and October, 1981. By the 
end of the year, new preliminary regulations were already publicized 
and their legal rationale established. The change in taking regula-
tions was justified not on the basis of any change in the wolf popula-
tion itself, but on the basis of long-standing sociological considera-
tions. In fact, the only significant change in the Minnesota Wolf Con-
troversy since 1975 has been the change in Interior Department ad-
ministrative policies and in its interpretation of the Secretary's role 
in conserving threatened and endangered species. The propriety of 
permitting the Secretary to exercise such leeway in interpreting its 
statutory authority will now be considered. 
175. Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528-31 (1982). 
176. See Memorandum, supra note 165. 
177. Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528-31 (1982). 
178. [d. 
179. See supra text and note at note 126. 
180. See supra text and notes at notes 128-29. 
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BROAD ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION OR 
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Given that Congress did intend to limit the discretion of wildlife 
managers to permit the taking of threatened species by enacting the 
Endangered Species Act, the question arises as to the wisdom of that 
approach. This question is not merely academic since the law may be 
subject to change. Indeed, Interior Department personnel have 
made it clear that if the recent timber wolf rulemaking is thwarted, 
the FWS may seek a congressional amendment to section 4(d) of the 
Act to broaden the agency's discretion to permit the taking of 
threatened species.18l 
The purpose of threatened species conservation is to identify 
species and subspecies in need of special protection and to take steps 
to prevent that species or subspecies from ever becoming in danger 
of extinction. 182 The threatened species protective regulations 
authorized by section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act were in-
tended to provide a "halfway house" for species which were no longer 
in imminent danger of extinction, but which still required special 
care in order to insure full recovery.183 In the following sections, it 
will be argued that the rigid legislative standard imposed by sections 
3(3) and 4( d) of the Act restricting the taking of threatened species is 
essential to the achievement of the purpose of the Endangered 
Species Act, and should not be diluted by Congress or the courts. 
A. Factors Affecting the Optimal Approach to Threatened 
Species Conservation 
The optimal amount of managerial discretion to be granted to the 
Secretary of the Interior under sections 3(3) and 4(d) of the En-
dangered Species Act must be assessed in light of several considera-
tions. A number of factors, some of which lead to conflicting conclu-
sions, should enter into any assessment of the Secretary's proper 
discretion in this area. Among the factors central to this assess-
ment are: (1) the importance of the Act's objective to maintain 
natural diversity;184 (2) the pervasiveness of a traditional consump-
tive ethic in society;185 (3) the consumption-oriented training of fish 
181. Personal Communication, Field Solicitor's Office (July, 1982). 
182. See supra text and notes at notes 73-75, 90-95. 
183. See supra text and notes at notes 73-75. 
184. See infra text and notes at notes 191-95. 
185. See infra text and note at note 196. 
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and wildlife managers, and their loyalties to a consumption-oriented 
constituency;186 (4) public attitudes toward threatened predator 
species;187 (5) the practical need for broad administrative discretion 
in managing threatened species;188 (6) the disadvantages of cen-
tralizing management discretion in Washington, D.C.;189 and (7) the 
advantages of removing decision-making from the influence of local 
pressures.190 
1. The Importance of Biological Diversity 
Harvard University biologist Edward O. Wilson recently pro-
claimed that the "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruc-
tion of natural habitats ... is the folly our descendants are least like-
ly to forgive US."191 It is just this folly which the Endangered Species 
Act is intended to prevent.192 Every plant and animal species driven 
to extinction reduces the genetic and species diversity of the planet. 
Reductions in species diversity weaken entire natural systems, 
removing built-in safeguards against stress and catastrophe.193 
Genetic diversity increases humanity's chances of overcoming its 
own problems of survival. 194 Agricultural and pharmaceutical 
discoveries of the future depend upon the continued existence of 
diverse biological types. Natural diversity is central to our own quali-
ty of life. 195 The crucial importance of preserving diversity through 
endangered and threatened species conservation is a factor which 
weighs in favor of ensuring the uncompromising guardianship of all 
species facing a risk of extinction. 
2. The Consumptive Ethic 
American and other western cultures generally harbor a pervasive 
consumption-oriented ethic in which the natural resources - land, 
water, forests, and wildlife - are to be used for financial gain and 
physical comfort. Natural systems are generally not valued by our 
186. See infra text and notes at notes 197-207. 
187. See infra text and notes at notes 208-11. 
188. See infra text and notes at notes 211-12. 
189. See infra text and notes at notes 212-14. 
190. See infra text and notes at notes 214-15. 
191. Chandler, Up for Review: The Endangered Species Act, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY 
NEWS 17 (1982). See also Pough, The Need for Species Diversity, DEFENDERS 37 (1981). 
192. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 4-6; S. REP. No. 307, 93rd Congo 1st 
Sess. 2 (1973). 
193. Roush, On Saving Diversity, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY NEWS 6 (1982). 
194. [d. 
195. [d. at 7-8. 
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society until they are digested into a form or product that society will 
pay for. Land is considered more valuable when it is tilled or devel-
oped. Forests provide timber. Water is used for drinking, cleansing, 
and manufacturing. Fish and wildlife provide food, clothing, and rec-
reation. Hunting, fishing, and trapping of wildlife beyond the needs 
of basic subsistence are one aspect of this social ethic. 
Congress identified this consumptive ethic as a primary cause of 
species extinction when it declared in the Endangered Species Act 
that such extinction was "a consequence of economic growth and 
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation. "196 
In passing the Act, Congress essentially attempted to legislate a new 
social ethic of conservation in place of consumption. If Congress is to 
give effect to such profound social change over the long term, it 
seems evident that institutional safeguards are required to prevent 
the legislative scheme from buckling under the pressure of demand-
ing "social norms." 
3. The "Consumption-Oriented" Persuasion of Wildlife Managers 
Wildlife managers traditionally have been trained to modify and 
manage land and water habitats in order to increase their productivi-
ty and their "carrying capacity" for consumable fish and wildlife.197 
They have not, until very recently, been trained in ecological prin-
ciples;198 nor have they been encouraged to maintain natural systems 
with an emphasis on overall species diversity.199 The primary reason 
for this "consumption-oriented" management training is· that most 
wildlife managers are employed by state fish and wildlife agencies or 
the United .States Fish and Wildlife Service. These agencies are 
usually financed in large part through taxes, hunting and fishing 
license fees, and, in the case of the FWS, duck stamp proceeds.20o In 
addition, all such agencies tend to align themselves with the interests 
of their most vocal constituents. Consequently, state and federal 
managers tend to be extremely sensitive to the traditional hunting, 
fishing, and trapping constituencies in making managerial and 
political decisions regarding wildlife resources.201 
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1982). 
197. Coggins and Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60 
OR. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1981). 
198. [d. at 66-69. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. at 66 (citing R. DASMANN, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 283 (3d ed. 1972); see 
also J. GoLDMAN, THE CEQ WILDLIFE LAW STUDY: LESSONS IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 8-10 
(unpublished manuscript, December 1978). 
201. Coggins and Ward, supra 197, at 73-74. 
96 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:63 
The emphasis on managing for consumption is reinforced by the 
fact that most state wildlife agencies are completely dependent upon 
the Governor and the state legislature for what limited managerial 
resources they possess. It is well established that state agency con-
servation decisions are frequently made "on the basis of non-
biological considerations at the behest of politicians or influential 
land users."202 Though less directly dependent upon the financial 
and political vagaries of traditional constituencies, federal fish and 
wildlife managers are subject to the same pressures. It has been 
noted by scholars in this area203 that in several instances, the FWS 
has arguably violated statutory requirements through "small shifts 
in emphasis to accommodate long-time constituencies and 
clientele."204 The authors observe that, perhaps such deference is 
endemic to government, federal and state, but until agency staffs 
can acquire or assert a far larger degree of independence from such 
influences, their credentials as experts or scientists merit less 
deference. 205 
This vulnerability of state and federal wildlife agencies to political 
influences, as well as the increased public interest in wildlife conser-
vation, has prompted Congress to enact federal wildlife legislation 
providing "enforceable standards and guidelines against which the 
decisions and standards of wildlife managers can be judged. "206 Re-
cent federal wildlife legislation has therefore adopted legislatively-
imposed conservation standards and permitted less managerial 
discretion.207 
4. Public Attitudes Toward Predator Species 
Many threatened and endangered species, such as the timber wolf, 
the grizzly bear, and various birds of prey, are predators or potential 
202. Id. 
203. See supra note 197. 
204. Id. at 88. Examples of such practices include: (1) permitting extended hours for water 
fowl hunting to the potential detriment of an endangered species, Defenders of Wildlife v. An-
drus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977); (2) permitting a state to preserve an artificial sport hunt-
ing area to the detriment of an endangered species, Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural 
Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); and (3) bowing to pressure of a State Governor to per-
mit non-wildlife recreation uses on a National Wildlife refuge, Defenders of Wildlife v. An-
drus, 11 E.R.C. 2098 (D.D.C. 1978); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446, 449 
(D.D.C. 1978). 
205. Id. at 73. 
206. Id. at 72. 
207. Id. 
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predators. Because many predator species are carnivores and often 
compete for the same resources as humans, they are particularly 
subject to human taking. A recent study of public attitudes by Dr. 
Stephen Kellert showed that although the majority of Americans 
support protection of endangered and threatened species, including 
predators and potential predators, isolated segments of society have 
strong negative attitudes toward such protection.208 Such negative 
attitudes toward predators are especially prevalent among farmers 
and livestock ranchers. 209 Whereas the overwhelming majority of 
the public favored individualized predator control (seventy percent) 
and opposed poisoning of predators (ninety percent), farmer and 
livestock rancher groups invariably (ninety-five percent) supported 
wide-scale elimination of the predator species and the use of poisons 
as control measures.210 
Kellert's findings suggest that state and federal conservation 
measures for the protection of threatened predator species are often 
subject to intense local pressure from ranching and farming constitu-
encies. Explicit legislative standards regarding the permitted taking 
of threatened species would help shield wildlife agencies from such 
pressure and would hold them accountable to the general public to 
uphold those standards. 211 
5. The Need for Management Flexibility in Threatened Species 
Conservation 
Although broad administrative discretion tends to subject agency 
decision-making to political pressure, wildlife managers are general-
ly more qualified to make day-to-day conservation decisions than are 
congressmen. Ecological strategies for restoring threatened species 
populations are as many and as varied as the species themselves. 
Identifying the measures best suited to species conservation requires 
knowledgeable judgments as to feasibility, biological effect, and allo-
cation of resources to optimize conservation of threatened and en-
dangered species. Consequently, the imposition of strict legislative 
standards must grant federal and state agencies sufficient flexibility 
to allow them to fulfill the mandate to conserve threatened and en-
208. Kellert, Americans' Attitudes and Knowledge of Animals, 45 TRANS. N. AMER. WILDL. 
CONF. 111-23 (1981). 
209. [d. at 119. 
210. S. KELLERT, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CRITICAL WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
ISSUES, PHASE I 52 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C. 1979). 
211. Coggins and Ward, supra note 197, at 72, 88-89. 
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dangered species. In this case, the need to restrict the unwarranted 
taking of protected species must be balanced with the need to pro-
vide wildlife managers with the necessary tools to conserve those 
protected species. 
6. Problems with Managing Wildlife from Afar 
Endangered and threatened species conservation is a national in-
terest and is therefore subject to federal legislation and federal agen-
cy administration. The effects of the law and regulations, however, 
are felt at the local level. State and municipal authorities often 
strongly oppose federal control of natural resources that were tradi-
tionally regulated at the state and local level. They perceive 
Washington politicians and bureaucrats as too far removed to re-
spond to local needs or to accomplish their own management objec-
tives effectively. 
Due to the cost-effectiveness of decentralized resource manage-
ment212 and local opposition to federal intrusion, state participation 
is critical to the effective conservation of threatened and endangered 
species. This realization prompted Congress to direct the Secretary 
to enter into cooperative agreements with qualified states under sec-
tion 6 of the Act.213 This presented Congress with a problem, 
however, since it recognized that it would have to afford the states 
broad discretion to permit the taking of threatened species in order 
to maximize state participation in conservation.214 To achieve this 
goal, Congress in turn would have to vest the Secretary with the 
discretion to set minimum conservation standards which would per-
mit the taking of threatened species. As a result, Congress' decision 
as to whether or not to impose a strict standard on taking involved a 
trade-off between optimizing state participation in species conserva-
tion and protecting threatened species from unwarranted taking. 
7. Distance as a Buffer from Local Pressure 
Although centralized national wildlife management sometimes 
lacks efficiency, it offers the advantage of buffering managerial deci-
sions from local pressures. Further, by limiting the discretion of the 
Secretary to permit the taking of threatened species, Congress 
removes that decision from the Interior Department and FWS and 
212. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 412, supra note 73, at 7; S. REp. No. 307, supra note 192, at 3. 
213. 16 U.S.C; S 1535(c) (1982). See supra text and notes at notes 80-95. 
214. [d. 
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thereby reduces agency vulnerability to its "consumption-oriented" 
constituencies. Pressures for excessive predation control, for in-
stance, are buffered by the fact that the agency has no authority to 
permit such takings. Similarly, by retaining federal control over con-
servation programs and setting strict guidelines for state conserva-
tion programs, Congress can better insure that state wildlife 
managers will not compromise the conservation goals of the Act 
under pressure from hunters, fishermen, ranchers, farmers, 
developers, or state politicians. 
The history of the timber wolf controversy vividly illustrates the 
interplay of these various and often conflicting considerations. It 
further suggests the advisability of imposing a strict legislative 
standard on the taking of threatened species. 
B. The Timber Wolf Lesson 
The Department of the Interior has made a final decision to return 
control of the wolf to the state of Minnesota and to permit its 
widespread taking. This decision violates the terms of sections 3(3) 
and 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act since the wolf population in 
Northern Minnesota does not represent "the extraordinary case 
where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be 
otherwise resolved."215 Further, it ignores Congress' objectives in 
passing the Act. The timber wolf is precisely the type of species for 
which Congress intended to provide "halfway house" protection.216 
Although its small population seems healthy in northern Minnesota, 
the factors which initially endangered the continued existence of the 
eastern timber wolf continue to jeopardize the species today: (1) in-
tensive human settlement of timber wolf habitat; (2) direct conflict 
with domestic livestock; (3) a lack of understanding of wolf ecology; 
(4) fears and superstitions about the animal; and (5) a propensity 
toward overzealous predator control programs.217 Without protec-
tive regulations, these factors could once again place the species in 
imminent danger of extinction. 
In addition, the timber wolf is a profound symbol of the value of 
species diversity. The wolf represents an important link in the 
ecology of the North Woods, maintaining the deer and moose popula-
tions within their biological carrying capacity. 218 Historically, the 
215. See supra text and notes at notes 62-98. 
216. See supra note 73. 
217. See supra text and note at note 50. 
218. L.D. MECH, THE WOLF: THE ECOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 
(1970). 
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wolf has provided humanity with valuable information: primitive 
man learned wilderness survival techniques from observing the 
wolf;219 modern man continues to learn from observing the wolf's 
complex social structure.220 Finally, the wolf has provided humanity 
with a source of ritual, mystery, and spiritualism, whether it be in 
the nature of religious rites or tribute to the spirit of the 
wilderness.221 
The consumptive ethic of western society has been, and continues 
to be, a major threat to the viability of the timber wolf. Proponents 
of livestock ranching, farming, hunting, forestry, mining, and trans-
mission line right-of-way have opposed measures to set aside remote 
wilderness-like areas as critical wolf habitats. Livestock ranchers, 
trappers, and hunters have opposed regulations prohibiting the tak-
ing of wolves, perceiving the animal as either a threat to their live-
stock or deer hunting success, or as a valuable furbearer resource. 
The intense political pressure exerted by these groups upon the FWS 
to eliminate protective regulations222 suggests the need for institu-
tional safeguards to insure the long-term effectiveness of the conser-
vation ethic embodied in the Endangered Species Act. 
The consumption-oriented bent of Minnesota's wildlife managers 
also emphasizes the compelling need for strict taking regulations. 
The Minnesota DNR, like most state wildlife agencies, is financially 
and politically dependent on its hunting and fishing constituency and 
the state legislature.223 The agency perceives that its top priority is 
the management of the deer population and contends that the deer 
are threatened by wolf populations in northern Minnesota.224 Fur-
thermore, livestock ranchers in northern Minnesota are a vocal 
political group which relied upon the DNR, prior to 1974, to control 
livestock predation by all predators.225 The DNR has been openly 
loyal to these interests, and has made clear its intention to manage 
the threatened timber wolf at "optimum" population densities which 
do not pose a threat to these interests.226 If the wolf conservation 
program is to be turned over to the Minnesota DNR and still retain 
the conservation goals of the Endangered Species Act, the discretion 
219. LOPEZ, OF WOLVES AND MEN ch. 2 (1978). 
220. Id., ch. 1. 
221. Id. 
222. See supra text and notes at notes 163-74. 
223. See supra note 200. 
224. See supra text and note at note 54. 
225. See supra text and notes at notes 21-26. 
226. MINNESOTA DNR, MINNESOTA TIMBER WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 11, 15 (February 
1980). 
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of the DNR to permit taking must be limited by explicit federal 
guidelines. 
Recommendations by FWS wildlife personnel, particularly those 
at the regional and field levels, to permit the taking of non-
depredating timber wolves, were influenced by pressures from the 
Agency's "long-term constituencies and clientele."227 The Service, 
however, successfully upheld the prohibition on taking for eight 
years, and modified its position only when a new legal interpretation 
removed the strict limitation on taking. 228 The history of the timber 
wolf controversy from 1973 to 1982 thus confirms the value of a 
legislatively-imposed standard in restricting the influence of 
consumption-oriented constituencies in wildlife conservation 
decision-making. 
The range of public attitudes toward the wolf mirror attitudes 
toward predators generally, 229 and provide a strong rationale for a 
legislatively-imposed standard in wolf conservation. The FWS 
recognizes hostile attitudes toward the wolf as a major factor 
threatening the species' recovery. 230 These attitudes are apparently 
concentrated among the livestock ranching, farming, and, in some 
cases, the hunting constituencies of northern Minnesota.231 These 
constituencies, as noted previously, are extremely influential within 
the state legislature, the DNR and, indirectly, the FWS. They have 
successfully pressured the FWS to weaken its regulations on preda-
tion control and thus effect a significant expansion in the program. 
In contrast, the very large constituency that supports timber wolf 
conservation is dispersed throughout the nation and has little direct 
influence on state and federal wildlife decision-makers except 
through their congressional representatives. Without a legislatively 
imposed restriction on taking, the proponents of extensive predator 
control will likely prevail in spite of the nationwide support for 
preservation of the timber wolf. 
The need for broad flexibility in day-to-day management of the 
timber wolf and the problems inherent in centralized management of 
227. See supra note 204. The FWS personnel response to DNR pressure fits the pattern of 
instances described by Coggins and Ward, supra note 197, wherein FWS arguably violated 
statutory standards through "small shifts in emphasis to accommodate long-time constituen-
cies and clientele." 
228. See supra text and notes at notes 160-74. 
229. See supra text and notes at notes 208-11. See also, R. Hook, Public Attitudes Toward 
Wolves in Michigan (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northern Michigan University, Mar-
quette, Michigan). 
230. See supra text and notes at notes 50, 173. 
231. See supra note 229. 
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the species require careful consideration in determining the optimal 
approach to timber wolf conservation. Two conditions are vital to 
wolf conservation in northern Minnesota at present: (1) maintaining 
a predation control program which adequately protects livestock in-
terests while safeguarding non-depredating wolves; and (2) en-
forcing prohibitions on the taking of wolves in extensive and often 
inaccessible areas with an understaffed enforcement team. 
The FWS largely resolved these problems with respect to the 
predation control program by locating the program in northern Min-
nesota and placing it under the supervision of Dr. L. David Mech, a 
renowned wolf expert and long-time resident of the state. 
Managerial flexibility in implementation of this program was nar-
rowed considerably by the 1978 Fund for Animals injunction,232 
which in some instances actually hampered the effectiveness of the 
program. The Service's 1983 regulations do, however, include some 
well-advised changes which expand FWS flexibility in day-to-day 
predation control decisions. These changes, in and of themselves, 
could improve the effectiveness of the depredation control program. 
The FWS recognized, however, that state cooperation and re-
sources were necessary to improve the enforcement of its taking 
prohibitions, and apparently concluded that the need for state par-
ticipation outweighed the need for a strict protective regulation on 
the taking of wolves. The Agency thus changed its regulations to 
permit taking, basing its decision upon sociological circumstances, 
and not on any rational biological basis.233 The FWS justified this 
decision on its belief that it had the discretion to loosen these restric-
tions on taking in order to gain the management and enforcement 
resources of the state, rather than comply fully with the legislatively-
imposed standard restricting taking and forego the cooperation of 
the state. In so doing, the Agency violated the very terms of the En-
dangered Species Act. 
Although local management and broad managerial flexibility are 
integral to threatened species conservation, they were in this case 
achieved at the expense of the very essence of the conservation 
scheme mandated by the Endangered Species Act: threatened 
species are to be taken only where biological circumstances make 
taking of the species in its own best interest.234 The timber wolf 
management controversy suggests that, in light of the pressures to 
232. See supra text and notes at notes 39-42. 
233. See supra text and notes at notes 174-80. 
234. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(3), 1533(d) (1982). 
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subvert conservation to "consumptive" interests, managerial discre-
tion to permit taking should be limited to protect threatened species 
from taking which is not based on the biological consideration of 
species population pressures. 
The eastern timber wolf controversy further attests to the political 
vulnerability of state wildlife agencies and the need for a strict 
legislative standard to buffer sensitive decisions from local influence. 
State DNR wolf management policies are affected by loyalties to its 
constituencies and its dependence on the state legislature.235 Hence, 
strict federal supervision of state conservation efforts is essential to 
insure long-term compliance with the conservation goals of the Act. 
The FWS and the Interior Department are subject to similar local 
pressures. The Service and the Department of the Interior were sub-
ject to political pressure from two sides: the Minnesota congressional 
delegation expressed the strong anti-wolf and anti-federal feelings of 
the vocal northern Minnesota constituency.236 Furthermore, the 
Minnesota DNR persistently sought to regain control of the eastern 
timber wolf for management as a furbearer resource and as a 
predator of livestock and deer. 237 The FWS and Interior Department 
were particularly susceptible to pressure from the DNR because of 
the statutory requirement to cooperate with the states.238 
The federal agencies could have insulated themselves from much 
of this political pressure had they continued to observe the strict 
statutory restriction on takings. Under such a strict legislative man-
date, the agencies could have responded to local pressures by assert-
ing that the decision was made by Congress and not subject to 
modification. While the legislative restriction on takings in the wolf 
controversy did not prevent the Interior Department from reaching 
a largely political decision, it has at least provided the legal basis for 
a citizen suit contesting the legality of the decision under the En-
dangered Species Act, and thus rendered the agencies accountable 
for their actions.239 
235. See supra text and notes at notes 197-205. 
236. See supra text and notes at notes 160-70, 208-11. 
237. See supra text and notes at notes 53-57 and 141-63. 
238. See supra text and notes at notes 7, 16, 83-93. 
239. See supra text and notes at notes 21-22. In the absence of a strict statutory standard 
for taking of endangered and threatened species, the decision to permit taking of the timber 
wolf would be left to the discretion of the Secretary and subject to a much less rigorous level of 
judicial review. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The objective of the Endangered Species Act is to channel the 
energies of federal and state resource management agencies into the 
conservation of threatened and endangered species. The experts 
upon whom Congress must depend for implementation of the Act, 
however, often retain strong political, economic, and philosophical 
ties to constituencies that embrace a traditional "consumption-
oriented" ethic toward protected species. The potential for local 
pressure to permit the taking of threatened species is particularly 
acute because of the states' traditional control over the taking of 
resident fish and wildlife, the consumptive ethic which drives such 
taking, and the "halfway house" status of threatened species. 
For all these reasons, threatened species conservation optimally 
should be achieved by imposing a strict legislative standard on the 
taking of threatened species and restricting the Secretary's discre-
tion to permit taking only "in the extraordinary case where popula-
tion pressures ... cannot be otherwise relieved," as required by sec-
tion 3(3) of the Act. By articulating a specific legislative standard on 
taking, Congress made available judicial review of the Secretary's 
managerial decisions, and thus rendered those responsible for these 
decisions accountable to the public. The legal process is essential to 
making wildlife agencies accountable to the public in their manageri-
al decision-making: 
[L]egislatures impatient with perceived failures have loaded the 
agencies with onerous new duties; private organizations have 
functioned as agency watchdogs; and courts have become will-
ing to measure agency performance against statutory stand-
ards.240 
Without a legislatively imposed standard for the taking of resident 
threatened species, a crucial aspect of the strategy for preventing 
the world-wide extinction of fish and wildlife is left to the discretion 
of wildlife agencies vulnerable to intense political pressure. It is 
unlikely that Congress intended to allow this landmark conservation 
law to be rendered meaningless through the administrative decisions 
of its implementing agencies. 
240. Coggins and Ward, supra note 197, at 155. 
